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Location-based mobile social network services such as Foursquare and Gowalla
have grown exponentially over the past several years. These location-based ser-
vices utilize the geographical position to enrich user experiences in a variety of
contexts, including location-based searching and location-based mobile advertis-
ing. To attract more users, the location-based mobile social network services pro-
vide real-world rewards to the user, when a user checks in at a certain venue or
location. This gives incentives for users to cheat on their locations.
In this thesis, we investigate the threat of location cheating attacks, find the
root cause of the vulnerability, and outline the possible defending mechanisms.
We use Foursquare as an example to introduce a novel location cheating attack,
which can easily pass the current location verification mechanism (e.g., cheater
code of Foursquare). We also crawl the Foursquare’s website. By analyzing the
crawled data, we show that automated large scale cheating is possible. Through-
out this work, we aim to call attention to location cheating in mobile social net-
work services and provide insights into the defending mechanisms.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Location-based Social Network Services
A recent surge of location-based services (LBS) led by Foursquare[1], Gowalla[2],
GyPSii[3], Loopt[4], Brightkite[5] has attracted a great deal of attention. Take
Foursquare as an example, it has become one of the top recommended applica-
tions for all smartphone platforms. As of August 2010, Foursquare had attracted
1.89 million users since its launch in March 2009, and it draws in more than 10,000
new members daily. Meanwhile, hundreds of other similar services have been set
up to follow this growing trend.
To encourage the use of location-based social network services, the service
providers offer virtual or real-world rewards to a user if he or she checks in
at a certain venue (i.e., places like coffee shops, restaurants, shopping malls).
Foursquare provides real-world rewards (e.g., a free cup of coffee from Starbucks),
which gives users incentives to cheat on their location information so that they can
check in at a venue far away from where they really are.
In this work, we use Foursquare as an example to investigate the vulnerability
2in location-based social network services. The goal is to raise awareness of loca-
tion cheating and suggest possible solutions to drive the success of the business
model among service providers, registered venues, and users.
We first introduce a novel and practical attack on location cheating, where a
user may claim he or she is at a certain location which is thousands of miles away
from his/her actual location, thereby deceiving the service provider on location
information. Though Foursquare has adopted the cheater code to stop location
cheating, we show that an attack can easily pass the cheater code. This benefits
attackers in the real world and can be more severe when combined with the anal-
ysis on venue (or location) profiles. In order to study Foursquare’s vulnerability
to location cheating, we also crawled Foursquare’s website and used the crawling
results to find suspicious cheaters on Foursquare.
We found that the root cause of the vulnerability to location cheating is the
lack of proper location verification mechanisms. If a user explores the open source
operating systems for smart phones (e.g., Android) to modify global-positioning-
system-(GPS)-related application programming interfaces (APIs), the user is able
to cheat on his/her location using falsified GPS information. Even if defending
mechanisms like cheater code are deployed, the loosely regulated anti-cheating
rules still leave space for location cheaters.
We would like to make the following clarifications about this work:
1. We have obtained consent from Foursquare to reveal the findings described
in this thesis.
2. Part of this work has been published in the 31st International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS’11).
31.2 Contribution
The major contributions of our work are listed as follows:
1. We investigated the methods to cheating on Foursquare, the leading location-
based social network. The methods may also apply to other similar LBSs.
2. We crawled data from Foursquare’s website and showed how to use it to
increase the effectiveness/damage of location cheating attacks.
3. We investigated current anti-cheating methods that Foursquare uses. Our
investigation suggests that defending against location cheating requires im-
provement to location verification ability.
4. We outline the possible solutions to defend against location cheating. We
suggest service providers take the following measures to prevent location
cheating: (1) explore effective location verification technologies, and (2) limit
profile crawling and analysis to mitigate the threat of location cheating.
We believe that this investigation on location cheating will have a great impact
on mobile social network services, and it will be an active research topic with
strong practical value.
1.3 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we briefly describe
the background of LBS and its associated business model, cheating scenarios and
cheater code. In chapter 3, we introduce a basic location cheating attack, demon-
strate how to automate the cheating, and optimize the benefits to the attacker
through crawling and profile analysis. In chapter 4, we show the results from our
4experiments on location cheating and examine the seriousness of current cheating
threats. In chapter 5, we discuss possible solutions to prevent location cheating.
In chapter 6, we provide our conclusions and discuss future work.
5Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we provide background and describe current practices used by
location-based mobile social network services.
2.1 Business Model of LBS
Location-based social networking services allow users to share their location-
related information. Users can add comments about a restaurant, find out what’s
happening, let their friends know where they are, and meet friends nearby for a
cup of coffee. To report the geolocation to a service provider (e.g., Foursquare[1]),
a user needs to “check in” to the location/venue where the user is. The service
provider may broadcast the user’s location information to his/her friends or even
the public. The check-in is done by hand, which means a user is able to determine
if he/she wants to check in, thereby controlling their location privacy. Services
like this are not new, but they all have lacked incentives for people to use them,
until Foursquare introduced a new business model.
Foursquare uses a progressive reward mechanism to provide four types of
6reward incentives to its users. Listed from the easiest to the hardest to obtain,
they are: points, badges, mayorships, and read world rewards. The first three are
virtual rewards: (1) points are provided for all valid check-ins (e.g., the first time
to check in to a venue, check in to the same venue multiple times); (2) badges are
awarded for specific achievements, such as “30 check-ins in a month” or “checked
into 10 different venues”; (3) mayorship of a venue is granted to the user who
checked in to that venue the most days in the past 60 days. Only the number
of days with check-ins to this venue are counted, without consideration of how
many check-ins occurred per day or the total number of check-ins. Unlike points
and badges which are solely dependent on a user’s activities, the title of “Mayor”
is given on a competitive basis. There is only one mayor for each venue. This will
create vulnerability that if an attacker got the mayorship of this venue and kept
checking in to it every day, no other user can get the mayorship from the attacker.
(4) Real-world rewards, like a free cup of coffee, are provided by businesses
(e.g., restaurants or bars) that set up a partnership with Foursquare. We crawled
the information for all venues (discussed in more details later) and found that
more than 90% of the rewards were only for mayors. This setup provides benefits
for both Foursuqare and its partner businesses: On the one hand Foursquare does
not need to pay for those real world rewards; On the other hand, the user’s de-
sire for discounts and their competition for the mayorship will likely bring more
users (customers) to the partner businesses, thereby increasing their profits. While
the business model benefits multiple parties in the game, it makes Foursquare a
lucrative target of attacks by location cheating.
72.2 Possible Location Cheating Scenarios
In the context of location-based social network services, a user may cheat on
his/her location for various reasons. A user may want to get rewards from venues
or impress others by claiming a false location. A business owner may use location
cheating to check into a competing business, and badmouth that business by
leaving negative comments.
Similar to most location-based social network services, Foursquare initially re-
lied on users’ self-regulation to maintain the authenticity of the check-ins. Hence,
the check-ins to any place a user can find in the Foursquare client application (using
the suggested list of nearby venues, searching for a venue by name, or browsing
and locating the venue on the map) were valid. Software tools are available on
the market that can automatically check people into their desired venues, e.g.,
“Autosquare” for Android. The basic cheating method worked in the early days
of Foursquare. It is rather simple and obviously does not work now after the
introduction of location verification mechanism, which requires location informa-
tion to complete the check-in process. However, location cheaters can modify the
location information and send false locations to the server.
The objective of the attacks is to automatically check into as many businesses
as possible and as frequently as possible to maximize benefits through location
cheating. A more sophisticated attack is automated cheating. To make automated
cheating easier, the cheaters may use venue profile analysis to identify victims,
which can be the venues who provide discounts or users who are aiming to get
mayorships in specific venues. Hence, an attacker is able to select the venues
where the “Mayor” title is less competitive and the rewards are more desirable
or use a minimum number of check-ins to prevent another user from getting a
8mayorship.
2.3 Cheater Code
Foursquare has adopted the cheater code to defend against location cheating at-
tacks. One of its functions is to verify the location of a device by using the GPS
function of that device. If a user claims that he/she is currently in a location far
away from the location reported by the GPS of his/her phone, this check-in will
be considered invalid and won’t yield any rewards.
Apart from utilizing GPS for location verification, the cheater code also incor-
porates multiple rules which runs on Foursquare servers to determine if a user
cheats on its location. The details of the cheater code are concealed from users. But
we managed to detect a few rules, through experiments, that are important to
maneuvering the location cheating to pass the scrutiny of the cheater code. A part
of the criteria used in determining location cheating in the cheater code are listed
as follows.
Frequent check-ins: We found a user cannot check in to the same venue again
within one hour. This rule prevents a user from checking in frequently to get
as many points as possible and keep his/her name always on top of the recent
check-in list, making it more likely for people to contact the user for comments
about the venue.
Super human speed: If a user continuously checks into locations that are
located far away from each other, Foursquare will indicate that the user is moving
at “super human speed” and refuse to give any reward for his/her check-ins. This
rule limits location cheating by a single user to a small geographic area.
Rapid-fire check-ins: If a user checks into multiple venues that are located
9within a 180 meters by 180 meters square area (which is well within a short walk-
ing distance such as in a mall) with a 1 minute interval, Foursquare issues a
warning about “rapid-fire check-ins” on the fourth check-in. This rule stops a
user from checking in to multiple venues in a small area and in a short time
period.
These rules essentially limit the number of check-ins a user can perform daily,
thus reducing the potential for automated cheating. Clearly identifying these
rules helps attackers to design the best way to work around them.
10
Chapter 3
Location Cheating Attack
In this chapter, we outline three levels of attack: cheating via GPS, automated
cheating, and cheating with the assistance of venue profile analysis. They will
severely interrupt the operation of LBSs when combined together. We first intro-
duce four location cheating methods which can pass the validation from Foursquare
and other similar location-based social network services at least once. After that,
we crawl data from Foursquare’s website and evade Foursquare’s cheater code to
automate the cheating process. Finally, by analyzing the crawled data, we focus
on a cheating attack on high valued targets such as those who provide real world
rewards.
3.1 Location Cheating against GPS Verification
Location-based services like Foursquare use their client applications installed on
their users’ smartphones to get GPS location readings, since this happens com-
pletely on the client side, it is relatively easy to hack. We analyzed Foursquare’s
client application source code and confirmed that it gets the GPS location data
11
GPS Module
Foursquare
Client Application
Foursquare Server
Cheating Mobile Phone
Current location:
Albuquerque, NMFake location:
San Francisco, CA
I am in 
“San Francisco, CA”
GPS Satellites
Figure 3.1: Illustration of location cheating.
from the phone’s GPS-related APIs. Figure 3.1 shows the concept of such location
cheating: Normally, the GPS module in a mobile phone will return the current
location information to the LBS application, but an attacker blocks this and feeds
fake location information to the LBS application so that it makes its server believe
that this phone is really at the falsified location. The cheating check-in will then
be approved.
There are at least four ways for an attacker to pass the GPS verification by
providing Foursquare’s client application with fake GPS coordinates:
1. Via GPS APIs:
This method modifies the GPS-related APIs in a smartphone’s operating
system to return fake GPS data. This is easy because the prevalence of
12
open source smartphone operating systems like Android. These APIs can
be modified to get GPS locations from sources other than the phone’s GPS
module, for example, from a server that returns fake GPS coordinates, or
simply from a local file. This method is limited to open source operating
systems, because it is difficult to modify a closed source system like iOS
from Apple; but since LBSs like Foursquare provide their client applications
on multiple major smartphone platforms (Android, iPhone, Blackberry), this
is a universal cheating method. A hack into Android is representative to
cover cross-platformed LBSs.
2. Via GPS module:
Directly hacking into a smartphone’s GPS module is another way of falsify-
ing the location. There are two ways to do this: one via hardware and the
other is via software. The former modifies the physical GPS hardware inside
the phone, making it capable of faking data, so that the cheating is transpar-
ent to the mobile phone’s operating system. The latter simulates a GPS
device. For example, an attacker can write a program on a computer that
simulates the behavior of a Bluetooth GPS receiver and let the phone con-
nect to this simulated Bluetooth GPS receiver, enabling the simulated GPS
to return fake coordinates. In fact, there are already a number of such tools
on the market (e.g., Skylab GPS Simulator[6], Zyl Soft[7], GPS Generator
Pro[8]), that were originally developed to help debug GPS-related software
or gadgets.
3. Via server APIs:
Foursquare provides a set of application APIs that allow developers to create
new applications for them, like an application for uploading GEO-tagged
13
photos. These APIs can be employed by a location cheater to check into
a place. The drawback is that not all LBS service providers provide such
public server side APIs. But this method is more convenient to issue a large-
scale cheating attack.
4. Via device emulator:
Smartphone manufacturers (like Apple, Google, and Microsoft) provide de-
vice emulators to developers for easier debugging and testing. A device
emulator is a full featured virtual machine of that device. One of the basic
features of these device emulators is that they are configurable, including
their simulated GPS module. Taking the Android device emulator for exam-
ple, we can send it a specific command to set a location to the simulated GPS
module. The GPS module of this emulator will return the coordinates we
set to whichever applications that need GPS info. We conducted our exper-
iments with this method, because this one is the easiest and most reliable
when compared to the first three methods. Almost all potential attackers
with a basic knowledge of mobile developing can master this method with
no difficulty.
We chose Android emulator to conduct our experiments. By default, the emu-
lator prohibits the android market so we have to hack the emulator first to get the
Foursquare application installed. The reason the Android emulator has this limit
is that Google only wants developers to test their own programs in the emulator.
We bypassed this limitation by using a full system recovery image from a device
manufacturer’s website to run the Android Virtual Device. This will restore the
emulator back to a full featured system with the Android Market, thus enabling
us to install Foursquare or any other LBS applications on it.
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We registered a user on Foursquare for testing purposes, and conducted all
of our experiments in Albuquerque, New Mexico and Lincoln, Nebraska. Our
goal was to check in to venues outside of the two states, so we knew the cheating
method was working. We used the tool “Dalvik Debug Monitor”, which is part
of the Android SDK to connect to the emulator and set GPS coordinates in it. We
obtained the coordinates of the target venues by looking up Google Earth, which
shows the exact coordinates of where the mouse is pointing on its map.
The entire cheating process can be described as: hack the emulator; install and
run Foursquare application; find the coordinates of the target venue in Google
Earth; use “Dalvik Debug Monitor” to set the coordinates in the emulator; find
the target venue in the list of nearby venues in Foursquare application; and check
into the target venue.
The results of our experiments showed that the check-ins to distant venues
were all accepted, and we received rewards successfully. We got points for each
of the check-ins, and we got badges like a normal user as well, i.e. after checking
in to 10 different venues, we got the badge “Adventurer: You’ve checked into 10
different venues!”. We also tried to get a mayorship, we chose the venue “Fish-
erman’s Wharf Sign” in San Francisco which is a well-known tourist spot as the
target venue, and we kept checking in to it once a day for 4 consecutive days. Af-
ter 9 days, we had found our test user became the mayor of the venue. Figure 3.2
shows the result of a later check-in to “Fisherman’s Wharf Sign”. This experiment
shows that the device emulator method works and can receive the rewards.
15
Figure 3.2: We checked into Fisherman’s Wharf Sign in San Francisco, got point
reward, and maintained our mayor status.
3.2 Crawling Data from Foursquare’s Website
Getting the big picture of Foursquare users and venues is a great help for the
location cheating attacks, although the crawling itself is not an attack. There are
two types of information that we crawled: users’ profiles and venues’ profiles.
In this section, we describe the crawling procedure, in which we only accessed
Foursquare’s public webpages. Wondracek, Holz, Kirda and Kruegel[9] intro-
duced a similar crawling and attacking approach. We will also use the crawling
results to show the evidence of existing location cheating attacks on Foursquare
16
and identify the suspicious location cheaters in next section.
To increase performance, we developed a multi-thread crawler to download
and process a large amount of webpages (over 7 million). This architecture has
proven to be highly effective, for example, Cho, J. and Garcia-Molina used a paral-
lel crawler to increase performance[10], and Chau, Pandit, Wang, Faloutsos focus
on crawling social networks with parallel crawling [11].
We wrote the crawler in C# and used MySQL as the database. We ran the
crawler on 3 Windows PCs at the same time, each with a 2.0GHz Intel Core
2 Duo processor and 1GB RAM. The fourth computer with the same hardware
specifications, but running Ubuntu 8.10 server operating system and functions
served as a database server. In our design, we set 14 to 16 threads on each of the
three crawling machines to crawl 100,000 users per hour for user profile crawling,
and set 5 to 6 threads on each machine to crawl around 50,000 venues per hour
for venue profile crawling.
In total, we crawled more than 1.89 million users and 5.6 million venues, which
coincide with the Foursquare’s reported number of users. This means we can
update all user profiles in less than two days, or update all venue profiles in
about 5 days. The crawling performance is an important design concern, because
by repeatedly crawling data and comparing the differences between each set of
crawling results, we can further investigate the behaviors of its users and extract
more information. For example, the venue’s recent visitor list does not have a time
stamp to indicate when a user visited this venue; but if we crawl the venues daily,
then we will be able to determine how frequently a user checks into a venue. We
can further analyze the user behavior to show if the user is suspicious of location
cheating.
Each user on Foursquare has a profile that contains personal information. A
17
user’s profile provides information such as name, current location, number of
check-ins, reward information, and a list of friends. A user’s mayorships and
check-in history are hidden from the public, since these two types of information
may expose his/her location privacy. However, we can infer a user’s mayorship
information and partial check-in activities from venue profiles, which contain lists
of their recent visitors and links to their mayors. In addition, a venue’s profile also
provides its name, address, location, number of users who checked in, unique
visitors and tips.
To crawl these profiles, we need to know the URLs of these profile pages.
We discovered that Foursquare uses incrementing numerical IDs to identify their
users and venues. By changing the ID in the URL, we can crawl almost all of the
user and venue profiles. We believe this is a serious security weakness and should
be patched soon.
Two types of URLs can be used to access user profiles. The first one is with
an internal user ID in URL, like “http://Foursquare.com/user/-1852791”. To
access another user with ID 23456, we just replace the “1852791” in the URL with
“23456”, and we can visit the public profile page with the new URL. We believe
that we can access all users just by increasing or decreasing the user ID in the
URL. We implemented a web crawler to do so, and we discovered around 1.89
million users in August 2010. Another type of URL contains the username, like
“http://Foursquare.com/user/test”, where “test” is the username of a user. Not
every user has a username-based URL to the profile page. Out of 1.89 million
users, only 26.1% have usernames, so we used the URL with ID in our crawling
tool. For venue profiles, Foursquare only uses numbered IDs in the URL of the
profile pages, like “http://Foursquare.com/venue/1235677”.
After we had the URL of a profile page, we sent HTTP Get to this URL and got
18
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ID
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TotalCheckins
TotalBadges
TotalMayors
RecentCheckins
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Name
MayorID
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UniqueVisitors
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Machines
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Figure 3.3: Crawling architecture and the database to store crawled information
from Foursquare.
the HTML source code from the server’s response. To extract data from the HTML
source code, we let the crawler perform a set of regular expression matches. After
extracting the data, we stored user and venue information in a database. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the structure of the database; the arrows indicate the relationships
between the tables. We stored user and venue profiles in tables UserInfo and Venue-
Info respectively; and we also created a table called RecentCheckins to record the
relations between venues and users. We put each venue’s recent visitors in this ta-
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ble; and by counting the number of records for a user, we recorded the number of
recent check-ins of this user and stored it in RecentCheckins of UserInfo. Similarly,
by analyzing the MayorID of each venue, we calculated how many mayorships
each user had and put the result in TotalMayors of UserInfo.
3.3 Automated Cheating
To achieve significant benefits from location cheating, attackers need to be able
to control a large number of users and make them check in automatically. This
requires the location cheaters to (1) automatically find location coordinates of
victim venues, and (2) automatically select a list of venues to check in to in order
to pass the cheater code. We met the first requirement by crawling, and we could
easily use SQL commands to get the location coordinates of the selected venues
from the database.
Figure 3.4 shows the coordinates of all Starbucks branches in the US, where
x axes and y axes are real coordinates. The location coordinates form the shape
of the United States territory, because Starbucks’ branches are distributed all over
the US. We draw this map by SQL command:
SELECT Longitude, Latitude FROMVenueInfo WHEREName LIKE “%Starbucks%”.
Second, to pass the anti-cheating verification, the key is to avoid triggering
any of the rules in the cheater code, since it detects cheating behavior on a per user
basis, we focus on the strategy of a single user. An attacker needs to organize co-
ordinates from the first step into a schedule, which states the sequence of venues
to check into and the time interval between the check-ins; and the schedule must
follow all rules from the cheater code. The attacker could create a tool to do this
automatically.
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Figure 3.4: Locations of Starbucks branches crawled from Foursquare’s website.
To determine the sequence of venues in which to check in, an attacker can
create a virtual user, compute a virtual path to visit the target venues using Google
Map’s APIs, and build the check-in schedule along the virtual path. We also need
to determine the time interval T between check-ins, which is determined by the
distance between the check-ins in the schedule. Based on our experiments, we can
check into venues less than 1 mile apart with a 5-minute interval without being
detected as a cheater. So for distance D less than 1 mile, we should set T to 5
minutes, if D > 1 mile, we let T = D ∗ 5 minutes.
In our proof of concepts experiment, we created a semiautomatic location
cheating tool. With the tool, an attacker can use any venue as the starting point.
The attacker can then set the next cheating location by setting the moving direc-
tion and distance, for example, “move 500 yards to the west”, the tool will search
for the venue that is the closest to the target location and then automatically set
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Figure 3.5: An illustration of location cheating check-ins along a virtual path in
the city.
the coordinates of the venue found to the emulator or generate a list for fully
automated check-ins later. The tool also automatically limits the process to avoid
triggering any anti-cheating rules in the cheater code as we presented before.
Figure 3.5 shows the path of a virtual tour, the diamond points are the loca-
tions of venues the tool actually selected and checked into, and the cross-points
and lines to them show the intended moving directions and target locations. The
starting point in this tour is at the lower left point of Figure 3.5. We started by
moving north and then kept turning right. The desired moving distance for each
step was 0.005 degrees, either longitude or latitude, equivalent to about 550 me-
ters in latitude direction or about 450 meters in longitude direction around this
location. We set the interval between check-ins to 5 minutes since the moving
distance is less than 1 mile. We continued checking into 25 venues without being
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detected as a cheater, and we received reward points and badges accordingly.
As we can see in Figure 3.5, most of the time, the actual venues we checked
into are not very far from the desired location, this is due to the high density of
venues in the city. To move across large distances, we should increase the moving
distance of each step, which will reduce the probability that we drift too far from
the desired direction, like the second to last move in Figure 3.5.
3.4 Cheating with Venue Profile Analysis
Since brute-force check-ins increase the chance that a cheater is caught, a location
cheater may gain intelligence from venue analyses after crawling. For example, an
attacker may select the victim venues that provide special offers to their mayors
and don’t have a mayor yet (or are less competitive for mayorship) as targets. It
is relatively easy to become the mayor of these venues. Amongst the venues we
have crawled, around 1000 venues fall into this category.
Through profile analysis, we found a user on Foursquare is the mayor of 865
venues but with a total number of check-ins of only 1265. It is interesting to
observe that most of the 865 venues have no other visitors during the past 60
days, so only one check-in is enough to get the mayorship. We also discovered
some special offers that do not require mayorship which are much easier to obtain,
it’s difficult to find such information without crawling the venue profiles.
The attack can also target other users. For example, to stop a user from getting
any mayorship, the attacker will analyze venue profiles and find venues that the
victim user is mayor of or has been to. Then the attacker will apply an automated
cheating attack on those venues in order to attack the mayorships of the victim.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation of Location Cheating on
Foursquare
We have demonstrated how to do location cheating attacks on Foursquare. Next,
we will show a big picture of location cheating through our crawling and anal-
ysis. In this chapter, we examine the signs of location cheating on Foursquare.
We found three identifying factors that are related to location cheating. They
are: (1) above normal level of activity, (2) below normal level of rewards, and (3)
suspicious check-in patterns.
4.1 High Check-in Frequency in Recent Visitor List
If a user checks in too frequently and at too many venues, it is suspicious, because
it is unlikely the user visits so many places in a short amount of time.
We crawled the record of 20 million check-ins, and each of them represents a
user visiting a venue once. That means, on average, each user on Foursquare has
checked into at least ten venues, and a venue has had at least four visitors. The
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actual number should be higher since only recent check-ins were shown on the
website and were crawled.
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Figure 4.1: Recent check-ins vs. total check-ins: the average recent check-ins of
the users who have a certain number of total check-ins.
Figure 4.1 shows a relationship between the number of total check-ins and the
recent check-ins. A recent check-in of a user means that the user is in a venue’s
recent visitor list, but we cannot directly know when this check-in happened. If
this user is the only visitor of this venue, then he/she will stay in the recent visitor
list even if this check-in happened a year ago. In fact, there are 1,291,125 venues
that have only one check-in; and 2,014,305 venues have had only one visitor ever.
Though it is not a hard proof, the high ratio of recent check-ins to total check-ins of
a user indicates that it is likely a user plays tricks in order to stay in the recent
visitor list, which is a sign of cheating. Here, we only included users with 2000 or
less total check-ins since they cover 99.98% of users. We get the number of recent
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Figure 4.2: Number of badges vs. number of check-ins: The average number of
badges granted to users who have a certain number of total check-ins.
check-ins vs. the number of total check-ins of each user, and then we compute
the average number of recent check-ins for users who have a given number of
total check-ins (see Figure 4.1). We can see that some users with more than 1,000
check-ins have an unusually high percentage of recent check-ins, which suggests
that those users are possibly cheaters, since it is not very likely for users to always
check into a large number of different venues in a short time period.
From Figure 4.1, we can see that, on average, we get around 100 recent check-
ins of a user, if the user did more than 500 check-ins total. There are 25,074 users
that have a total check-in number falling in between 500 and 2000. It’s not difficult
to determine where they have been or are likely to go from this data.
4.2 Low Reward Rate
If a user has a large amount of check-ins but little rewards like badges, the user
may have been detected as a cheater by Foursquare so those check-ins were inval-
idated toward rewards, although they still increase the total number of check-ins
of those users under Foursquare’s current policy. Figure 4.2 shows the relation
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between rewards (badges) and the number of check-ins. We first get the number
of badges vs. the number of total check-ins of each user, and then we compute the
average number of badges for users who have a given number of total check-ins.
As shown in Figure 4.2, for users with 1000 or less check-ins, the relation between
the number of check-ins and badges is stable. It illustrates that a user will be
likely to get more badges after doing more check-ins. It is reasonable because the
rewards are usually granted to those who have checked in over a certain number
of times to a venue. For the users with a larger number of check-ins, we can
see that the curve in Figure 4.2 oscillates dramatically. Actually, many users with
more than 1000 check-ins only have less than 10 badges. We think the best expla-
nation for this is that they are location cheaters and were caught by Foursquare
and, thus, their check-ins yielded no rewards. For almost all users with more than
9000 check-ins, the reward level is low. The average check-ins per day for these
users is over 16 times since the Foursquare service was launched in March 2009,
which is strong evidence that these users are cheaters.
We notice that among the 1.89 million users, 36.3% have never checked into
any venues, 20.4% have one to five check-ins, which means more than half of the
users have only checked in less than six times. On the other hand, 0.2% of the
users have checked in at least 1,000 times; and 11 users have checked in at least
5,000 times. These 11 users who have made no less than 5,000 check-ins can be
divided into two distinct groups by the number of mayorships they have. The
first group has six users, each of whom is mayor of tens of venues, which are all
concentrated in a city area. The other five users in the second group, including
the one with over 12,000 check-ins, the highest among all users, do not have any
mayorships, and they received much less badges than the first group. A further
analysis indicates that four of the five users in the second group appeared in a
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Figure 4.3: Check-in locations of a suspected cheater.
recent visitor list of a venue, while the users in the first group are all in the recent
visitor lists of a large amount of venues. This provides us with strong evidence
that the users in the second group are cheaters and were caught, so their check-ins
were invalidated.
4.3 Suspicious Check-in Patterns
Next, we will examine if the check-in pattern or history can tell if a user is a
location cheater through further analysis of the crawled data.
We analyze a user’s check-in pattern based on the recent check-in records.
Figure 4.3 shows the recent check-in locations of a suspected cheater. We draw
the venues to which a user has checked in on a map, so that we have a general
idea of the places the user has “visited”. This user is in the recent visitor lists of
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Figure 4.4: Check-in locations of a “normal” user.
over 1000 venues. As we can see in Figure 4.3, those venues are scattered pretty far
apart and spread over 30 different cities throughout the United States, including
Alaska, and Europe. Judging from this user’s ID (Foursquare increments this ID
as user registers), we believe that the user has used Foursquare for less than one
year. It illustrates that within a year, the user has “visited” at least 30 different
cities, hence this user is suspected of location cheating.
Figure 4.4 shows the recent check-in locations of a user with a similar number
of recent check-in records and similar ID (it means the two users registered for
the Foursquare service at almost the same time) as the user in Figure 4.3. But
the venues he/she visited are concentrated in three cities (places with darker
markers) and a few other places, where he/she may have visited on vacation.
After examining the users with more than 1,000 recent check-in records, users
with more than 2000 total check-ins, and users with more than 100 mayorships,
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we believe that the check-in pattern in Figure 4.4 is normal.
In the future, we will focus on those cheaters that haven’t been detected
by Foursquare’s current system. Foursquare implemented its cheater code anti-
cheating system online around April 2010. Since then, all detected cheating check-
ins still count in the total number of check-ins, but do not receive any rewards. By
the time this work was conducted (August, 2010), all mayors passed the scrutiny
of the cheater code. So any cheaters we found in this group of users were new dis-
coveries. There are 425,196 users who have the mayor title, and there are 2,315,747
venues which have mayors. On average, each user with a mayorship is the mayor
of 5.45 venues. Those who are mayors of many venues are likely to be cheaters.
30
Chapter 5
Possible Solutions against Location
Cheating
The investigation presented in this work allows an attacker to launch automated
location cheating attacks against a large number of victims, including service
providers, business partners, and users. The root cause of the vulnerability is
the lack of effective location verification mechanisms which can be deployed on
a large scale. However, it is possible to counter these attacks. In this chapter, we
list possible techniques to thwart location cheating, and we suggest that location
security be enhanced by limiting the access to user and venue profiles.
5.1 Location Verification Techniques
Distance bounding: Distance bounding protocols [12], [13], [14] that exploit the
limitation on transmission range or speed of a communication signal for location
verification, which does not rely on GPS inputs. This solution requires the de-
ployment of verifiers around the registered venues; hence it’s expensive to deploy
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location verification based on distance bounding.
Address mapping: Using address mapping to geolocate IP addresses has been
proposed in various applications, such as Tracert Map and Google Location Service.
Researchers have adopted IP address mapping to locate mobile phones [15]. A
challenge of applying IP address mapping to verify location is that mobile phones
may access the Internet from nonlocal IP addresses, and the IP addresses can be
changed dynamically.
Venue side location verification: The Wi-Fi routers that provide the Wi-Fi hotspot
services can work as location verifiers. This technique provides an intrinsic dis-
tance bounding since only devices that are physically within the radio communi-
cation range of a Wi-Fi router can communicate with it. According to previous
literature [16, 17], the radio range of a Wi-Fi router is generally no more than one
hundred meters. This range level helps identify cheaters that are miles away from
the venue. However, for the cheaters within the transmission range a Wi-Fi router,
this approach does not work. For example, a cheater sitting inside a McDonald’s
can check-in to the Wendy’s next door, which is only 50 meters away. In this case,
the Wendy’s owner can configure the Wi-Fi router to limit the communication
within the restaurant via hardware or firmware configuration tools (i.e., DD-WRT
[18]).
In this solution, a Wi-Fi router takes the responsibility to measure if a check-in
message was sent from a device in a legal area by checking the communication
delay between the Wi-Fi router and the device. If so, the Wi-Fi router sends the
verification information to the corresponding LBS server. In order to provide
location verification service, the Wi-Fi router must be registered to the LBS server
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and establish trusted communication with the server to block the impersonating
attacks by location cheaters.
When comparing the three solutions, Distance Bounding provides the most ac-
curate location data, and it can be used anywhere, but it is difficult to implement
and has the highest cost. Address Mapping is the least accurate in terms of the
location data it provides, it can be used anywhere, and it has the lowest cost and
is the easiest to implement. Venue Side Location Verification has enough location
accuracy, and it incurs no extra hardware purchase or installation cost for the
venues. Owners of the venues can simply update the software on their existing
routers to make these routers capable of defeating location cheaters.
5.2 Mitigating Threat from Location Cheating
As alluded above, with the assistance of profile analysis, an attacker may optimize
the location cheating strategies. To limit the effect of potential location cheating
attacks, we need to reduce the information exposed to the public. Along this
direction we can employ the following techniques.
Access control for crawling: To prevent large-scale profile analysis by attackers, a
direct solution is to take counter measures to stop or limit crawling. If a user must
login to view the publicly available profile pages, it’s easier to detect the crawling
users and block them. This can be combined with IP address blocking, if the
service provider can detect the crawler’s IP address. Even if the crawlers hide
behind network address translations (NATs), blocking their IP addresses causes
limited collateral damage. Casado and Freedman [19] show most NATs only
have a few hosts behind them, and proxies generally have much more. Crawling
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behind a public proxy cannot achieve enough performance. Although tools like
Tor [20] may provide a high level of anonymity on the Internet, it also suffers
from limited performance for the purpose of crawling.
Hiding information from profiles: To reduce the information leak, we hope that
even if an attacker successfully crawled the website, the information that can
be extracted from the data is still limited. But if a subset of information in the
profiles is removed, the usability of the location-based social networking service
will suffer. For example, if the recent check-in list is removed from the venue’s
profile, users cannot contact the recent visitors to the venue for their comments
about the venue. Hence, removing the information from profiles is not a good
solution to prevent profile analysis. Rather, the service provider may use the hash
function to hide necessary information (such as user IDs in the recent check-in
list). Recently, the information leak has been studied. Griffith and Jakobsson [21]
use public records to infer individuals’ mothers’ maiden names, and Heatherly et
al. [22], as well as Zheleva and Getoor [23], show how public data provided by
social networks can be used to infer private information.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we present conclusions and future work of our project.
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we introduced a novel and practical location cheating attack that
enables an attacker to make the location-based service providers believe that the
attacker is in a place far away from his/her real location. Through real world ex-
periments on Foursquare, the leading location-based social network, we demon-
strate that our attacking approach works as expected; and location cheating really
threatens the development and deployment of location-based mobile social net-
work services. The counter measures against location cheating in current systems
are not perfect.
6.2 Future Work
We plan on two directions for future work: one focuses on crawling-based privacy
collecting, the other is the defense of location cheating.
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6.2.1 Privacy Leakage
We show the leakage of personal location history in Figure B.1, the “Who’s been
here” section reveals the list of recent visitors to this venue. After we crawled
webpages for all venues, we built a personal location history for each user on
Foursquare. Unfortunately, there are two obstacles that stopped us from further
investigation into privacy leakage in this work: (1) the “Who’s been here” does
not give the full list of visitor history; (2) the “Who’s been here” section was
removed right after we finished all the crawling.
In the future, we would like to take two approaches to investigate privacy
leakage: First, we will investigate more LBSs and providers of other services that
involve sensitive yet partially public personal information. Second, we will try
to collect location privacy from traditional social network services like Facebook
and Twitter, because many other services including LBSs are tightly integrated
with them. For example, Foursquare allows users to sign in using their Facebook
account, and after each successful check-in, Foursquare app wants to broadcast
this message on Facebook and Twitter by default.
6.2.2 Defense of Location Cheating
We have suggested several techniques for enhancing the security of location in-
formation. In the future, we will investigate further to find better solutions to
identify possible cheaters, especially those whom haven’t been found by the exist-
ing anti-cheating mechanisms. We also would like to seek better solutions to the
balance between usability and security in order to make location-based mobile
social networking services more attractive.
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Appendix A
Multi-threading in Crawler
Control of multi-threading in the crawler(C#):
// Mutex for multi-thread access to critical variables.
private static Mutex m_mutex = new Mutex();
// Desired thread count.
private int m_threadCount = 0;
// Set this to false to stop launching new threads.
private bool m_bRunning = false;
// Launch new threads until desired number was reached.
public void StartThread()
{
// User can adjust thread count in numericUpDown1
while (m_threadCount < numericUpDown1.Value)
{
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m_mutex.WaitOne();
m_threadCount++;
m_mutex.ReleaseMutex();
textBox2.Text = m_id.ToString();
// Launch a new crawling thread. Each thread crawls
// one URL which corresponses to one user or venue.
Thread newThread = null;
if (m_mode == Mode.User) // Crawl user information
{
newThread = new Thread(new ThreadStart(GetUserInfo));
}
else // Crawl venue information
{
newThread = new Thread(new ThreadStart(GetVenueInfo));
}
newThread.Start();
}
}
// This is a delegate to the real ThreadTerminated function.
delegate void ThreadTerminatedCallback(bool bSuccess);
// Define a callback function for the crawling thread, when it
// finishes, it will call this function.
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public void ThreadTerminated(bool bSuccess)
{
if (this.textBox1.InvokeRequired)
{
// This part is to go back to the thread of user
// interface (main thread), so that user can see
// the update immediately.
ThreadTerminatedCallback d =
new ThreadTerminatedCallback(ThreadTerminated);
this.Invoke(d, new object[] { bSuccess });
}
else
{
m_mutex.WaitOne();
m_threadCount--;
// Record process history
m_processed++;
if (!bSuccess)
{
m_failed++;
}
// Update user interface
textBox3.Text = m_processed.ToString();
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textBox4.Text = m_failed.ToString();
// Display remaining thread count during stopping.
if (false == m_bRunning)
{
Log("Working threads: " + m_threadCount);
if (m_threadCount == 0)
Log("Stopped");
}
m_mutex.ReleaseMutex();
// Always try to max the thread count after a thread
// finishes.
if (true == m_bRunning)
{
StartThread();
}
}
}
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Appendix B
Screenshots
Screenshots of Foursquare’s website and some tools used in location cheating.
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Figure B.1: Page of a venue on Foursquare’s website, “Who’s been here” section
reveals users location history, and has been removed.
45
Figure B.2: The user page of our testing user.
46
Figure B.3: Use Dalvik Debug Monitor to set the GPS of Android device emulator
to Golden Gate Bridge.
47
Figure B.4: The multi-threaded crawler we developed to crawl Foursquare’s web-
site.
